

VIDEO TAPED REMARKS TO  
THE OSD COMPTROLLER SEMINAR

6 - -73

THANKS LARRY./ I CERTAINLY WISH THAT  
I COULD BE WITH YOU IN PERSON TODAY./ I  
MUCH APPRECIATE THE INVITATION TO PARTI-  
CIPATE VICARIOUSLY/THROUGH THIS MEDIUM  
OF VIDEO-TAPE./ UNFORTUNATELY FOR ME/  
THIS IS A WIND-UP WEEK AT THE NAVAL WAR  
COLLEGE./ WITH GRADUATION COMING UP THIS  
SATURDAY./ I REALLY COULD NOT BREAK LOOSE  
AT THIS TIME./

I DO BELIEVE THAT OUR NEW PROGRAM  
HERE AT THE NAVAL WAR COLLEGE/MAY WELL  
BE OF INTEREST TO THOSE OF YOU IN THE  
COMPTROLLER BUSINESS./ IT IS CERTAINLY  
MY HOPE THAT IT WILL PRODUCE OFFICERS/  
WHO WILL ADAPT TO THE DEFENSE DECISION-  
MAKING PROCESS/A LOT MORE RAPIDLY AND  
EFFECTIVELY./ ONE OF THE TWO MAJOR THRUSTS  
IN THE NEW CURRICULUM/WE HAVE INSTITUTED  
AT THE WAR COLLEGE THIS YEAR/HAS BEEN

POINTED IN THIS DIRECTION. / SPECIFICALLY,  
WE HAVE SHIFTED THE FOCUS OF THE COLLEGE /  
SOMEWHAT AWAY FROM THE TRADITIONAL INTER-  
NATIONAL RELATIONS. / INSTEAD, WE HAVE  
ATTEMPTED TO BRING THE STUDENTS / INTO  
CLOSER CONTACT WITH PROBLEMS / THEY WILL  
FACE IN THEIR FUTURE CAREERS. / VERY FEW  
OF US IN UNIFORM REALLY CAN HAVE AN  
IMPACT / ON BROAD NATIONAL STRATEGY. /  
ALMOST ALL OF US WILL PLAY SOME ROLE / IN  
ALLOCATING THE RESOURCES ASSIGNED TO OUR  
SERVICE. / HENCE, WE HAVE CREATED HERE IN  
NEWPORT / A MANAGEMENT FACULTY THAT TEACHES  
DEFENSE ECONOMICS AND DEFENSE DECISION-  
MAKING. /

LET ME NOT MISLEAD YOU, HOWEVER, /  
THEY ARE NOT PREPARING OUR STUDENTS TO  
STEP RIGHT INTO ONE OF YOUR OFFICES / AND  
BE EFFECTIVE, WITH ALL THE CURRENT PRO-  
CEDURES AND JARGON. / INSTEAD, WE ARE  
PLAYING FOR THE LONG RUN. / WE ARE  
ATTEMPTING TO DEVELOP HABITS OF THOUGHT /  
AND APPROACHES TO PROBLEMS. /

THESE, WE BELIEVE, WILL PROVIDE A FOUNDATION/ON WHICH A STUDENT WILL SUBSEQUENTLY BUILD/BY ACQUIRING THE CURRENT DATA ON PROCEDURES AND PROBLEMS./

LET ME GO BACK A STEP, TOWARD THE BEGINNING/AND EXPLAIN WHY WE TOOK THIS APPROACH./ AT THE WAR COLLEGE WE WORK WITH A HAND PICKED GROUP OF ABOUT 450 OFFICERS IN TWO COURSES./ ONE IS FOR LCDR'S AND MAJORS, AVERAGE AGE ABOUT 33,/WHO HAVE ABOUT 12 YEARS OF COMMISSIONED SERVICE./ THE OTHER COURSE IS FOR COMMANDERS, CAPTAINS, LIEUTENANT COLONELS AND COLONELS,/OFFICERS WITH ABOUT 18 YEARS OF SERVICE AND AN AVERAGE AGE OF 41./ ONLY ABOUT 60% OF OUR STUDENT OFFICERS ARE NAVY./ ALL OF THE SERVICES AND THE COAST GUARD ARE REPRESENTED,/AS WELL AS CIVILIANS FROM THE STATE DEPARTMENT, THE CIA, THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE/AND VARIOUS NAVY BUREAUS AND LABS./

INCIDENTALLY, I AM ANXIOUS TO OBTAIN

ADDITIONAL CIVILIAN INPUT,/ AND WOULD WELCOME REPRESENTATION FROM THE OSD COMPTROLLER/ OR ANY OF THE OTHER COMPTROLLER AGENCIES./

WHEN THESE STUDENTS COME TO US,/ THEY ARRIVE FROM A BACKGROUND OF EDUCATION, EXPERIENCE, AND TRAINING/ WHICH INCULCATES IN THEM THE VIEWS OF A RATIONAL, NEWTONIAN UNIVERSE./ BY THIS, I MEAN THAT THEY BELIEVE/ THAT THERE ARE PRECISE RIGHT OR WRONG ANSWERS/ FOR ALMOST EVERY PROBLEM./ THIS IS, IN LARGE BECAUSE BOTH OUR OFFICERS AND OUR CIVILIANS/ COME FROM VOCATIONS THAT ACCENT THE WORLD OF TECHNOLOGY,/ WHERE THERE ARE RIGHT AND WRONG WAYS TO DO THINGS./ MOST COME TO US FROM AN AUTHORITARIAN CHAIN OF COMMAND./ THE OBLIGATIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF AUTHORITY/ ARE TO MAKE DECISIONS QUICKLY AND CORRECTLY/ NOT AMBIGUOUSLY AND UNCERTAINLY./

NOW THERE IS NOTHING WRONG WITH THIS,/ I THINK ALL OF YOU WILL AGREE TO THAT./ WE ARE A VERY TECHNICAL ORGANIZATION./ BUT, WHAT I AM SUGGESTING IS THAT,/ AS OFFICERS MOVE UP THE LADDER,/ THEY MUST BE ABLE TO DEAL INCREASINGLY WITH SITUATIONS/ WHERE THEIR RESPONSES CANNOT ALWAYS BE SIMPLE AND DIRECT./ DERIVATION OF STRATEGIES AND SOLVING PROBLEMS IN PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT, FOR INSTANCE, ARE NOT SUSCEPTIBLE TO PRECISE RIGHT OR WRONG ANSWERS./ MY JOB AT THE NAVAL WAR COLLEGE IS TO EDUCATE PEOPLE/ TO DEAL WITH SUCH ISSUES;/ TO GET OFFICERS TO RECOGNIZE THE SUBTLETIES,/ THE UNCERTAINTIES, AND THE INEXACTNESS OF THE DECISION PROCESSES/ REQUIRED OF A SENIOR OFFICER./

NOW AT THE WAR COLLEGE WE ARE TRYING TO APPROACH THIS PROBLEM/ THROUGH A NEW CURRICULUM, INSTITUTED THIS ACADEMIC YEAR./ LET ME START BY ILLUSTRATING HOW

WE OPEN THE YEAR/WITH QUESTIONS OF BROAD NATIONAL STRATEGY./ WHAT CAN THE NAVY CONTRIBUTE IN THE POST-CONTAINMENT ERA,/ OR MULTI-POLAR WORLD, OR WHATEVER ONE CALLS THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS THAT ARE EMERGING TODAY?/

WE HAVE PUT STRATEGY INTO OUR CURRICULUM THROUGH THE DEVICE OF MILITARY HISTORY./ WE HAVE ASKED THE STUDENTS TO DISSECT/ THE DECISION OF STRATEGISTS OF THE PAST./ FOR INSTANCE, WE BEGAN THIS YEAR-/ AND IT WAS SOMETHING OF A SHOCK TO THE STUDENTS, I MUST ADMIT-/ BY READING THUCYDIDES' HISTORY OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WARS./ NOW THESE WARS WERE NEARLY TWENTY-FIVE HUNDRED YEARS AGO./ MANY OF THE STUDENTS ASKED, "HOW IN THE WORLD CAN THIS BE RELEVANT/ TO WHAT I AM DOING IN THE LAST PART OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY?"/

WELL, THE WARS BETWEEN ATHENS AND SPARTA/ WERE WARS BETWEEN A SEAPOWERS AND A LANDPOWER;/ THEY WERE WARS IN WHICH

THE SEAPOWER, ATHENS, / DECIDED TO SEND AN  
EXPEDITION ACROSS THE SEAS / TO AS FAR  
AWAY AS SICILY. / THE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE  
BECAME OVEREXTENDED; / IT BECAME BOGGED  
DOWN. / THE PEOPLE OF ATHENS LOST ENTHU-  
SIASM FOR WHAT WAS GOING ON SO FAR AWAY  
FROM HOME. / THE CONSEQUENCES WERE SEVERE. /  
THE ANALOGIES ARE OBVIOUS. /

WE OF COURSE LOOKED AT NUMEROUS OTHER  
CASES OF MILITARY HISTORY: / SUCH AS THE  
NAPOLEONIC WARS; OUR CIVIL WAR; / THE SPANISH-  
AMERICAN WAR; AND THE WORLD WARS.

NOW WE DON'T BELIEVE THAT HISTORY /  
IS GOING TO REPEAT ITSELF. / WE DO BELIEVE  
THAT TODAY'S OFFICERS / MUST BE ABLE TO  
COPE WITH THE PRINCIPLES BEHIND HISTORY. /  
WE ARE EMPHASIZING THE THINKING PROCESS, /  
NOT THE ABSORPTION OF FACTS. / HOW DO WE  
DO THIS? / WE DO IT PRIMARILY BY MAKING  
THE STUDENT LOOK FOR THE VARIOUS ISSUES  
THAT IMPINGED / ON THE DECISIONS OF  
MILITARY LEADERS IN THE PAST. / WE WANT

OUR STUDENTS TO DO THEIR OWN DIGGING/  
IN THEIR HISTORICAL CASE STUDIES./ IN  
THE FUTURE THEY ARE GOING TO HAVE TO  
DIG OUT FOR THEMSELVES/WHAT LESSONS ARE  
APPLICABLE TO THE PARTICULAR CASES/IN  
MILITARY DECISION THAT THEY WILL BE  
DEALING WITH/IN 1974 OR 1978 OR WHENEVER  
IT MAY BE./ THE FACTS THAT ARE RELEVANT  
TO OUR STRATEGY TODAY/ARE NOT LIKELY  
TO REMAIN SO, FOUR, FIVE OR TEN YEARS  
FROM NOW./ BUT THE PRINCIPLES, THE PRO-  
CESS OF THINKING AND REASONING WILL BE,/  
AND THAT IS WHAT WE'RE TRYING TO GET  
ACROSS./

NOW TO GET MORE TO YOUR AREA OF  
INTEREST,/LET ME TAKE UP THE SECOND  
PART OF OUR CURRICULUM./ THIS IS THE  
COURSE IN DEFENSE ECONOMICS AND DECI-  
SIONMAKING./ WE APPROACH THIS AS A  
PROBLEM OF ALLOCATING RESOURCES/BY  
MAKING DIFFICULT DECISIONS OF CHOICE./  
WE ASK SUCH QUESTIONS AS/"HOW SHOULD



YOU APPROACH THE CHOICE BETWEEN BUILD-  
ING/FOUR NUCLEAR POWERED GUIDED-MISSILE  
FRIGATES OR TWENTY DESTROYER ESCORTS/AT  
APPROXIMATELY THE SAME COST?" / WE  
SUGGEST THAT THE PLACE TO BEGIN/IS BY  
ASKING "WHAT IS YOUR OBJECTIVE?" / "WHY  
DO YOU WANT A FRIGATE; WHY DO YOU WANT  
A DESTROYER ESCORT?" / THESE ARE OBVIOUSLY  
VERY IMPRECISE QUESTIONS. / THEY MUST BE  
ANSWERED IN MUCH THE SAME WAY/AS THE  
STUDENTS ANSWERED THEIR STRATEGY QUES-  
TIONS,/BY LOOKING AT THE BROAD OBJECTIVES/  
AND MAKING JUDGMENTS. / WE TRY TO IMPRESS  
ON THE STUDENTS/THAT SETTING AN OBJECTIVE  
IS AN IMPORTANT,/BUT NOT A PRECISE, FIRST  
STEP THAT MUST BE TAKEN. /

WE SPEND A FAIR AMOUNT OF TIME/IN  
MAKING THIS TRANSITION FROM THE STRATEGY  
CURRICULUM/TO DEFENSE DECISION MAKING. /  
THE STUDENTS READ NSSM-3,/THEY TRY TO  
UNDERSTAND HOW DIFFICULT IT IS TO MOVE  
DIRECTLY/FROM A BROAD NATIONAL OBJECTIVE

LIKE THE NIXON DOCTRINE/ INTO SPECIFIC  
OBJECTIVES OF HOW MUCH SEA CONTROL,/   
HOW MUCH TACTICAL AIR PROJECTION/ AND HOW  
MANY OF THE OTHER KINDS OF NAVAL FORCES  
WE NEED./

WE THEN MAKE THEM FACE A FACT/   
WHICH MANY OF THEM SIMPLY DO NOT APPRE-  
CIATE;/ THAT THERE ARE NOT ENOUGH  
RESOURCES TO GO AROUND./ THEY READ THE  
BROOKINGS BOOK ON SETTING NATIONAL  
PRIORITIES./ THEY READ HITCH AND MCKEAN./   
THEY READ ENTHOVEN AND SMITH./ WE GIVE  
THEM AN EXERCISE WITH THE TOTAL FEDERAL  
BUDGET/ IN A FIVE YEAR PROJECTION./   
LOOKING AHEAD THOSE FIVE YEARS,/ WE ASK  
THEM TO ALLOCATE THE FEDERAL BUDGET,/   
TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE GROWTH THAT IS  
BUILT INTO MANY PROGRAMS TODAY./ THEY  
QUICKLY REALIZE IT IS GOING TO BE DIFFI-  
CULT/ TO MAINTAIN THE DEFENSE SHARE OF  
THE BUDGET/ AND, INTERESTINGLY, MANY OF  
THEM RECOMMEND/ A SMALLER SLICE OF THE

PIE FOR DOD./ THEY ARE A LITTLE REBEL-  
LIOUS AT BEING ASKED/TO APPROACH THESE  
QUESTIONS WITH ONLY IMPERFECT AND IN-  
COMPLETE EVIDENCE/AND IN A VERY SHORT  
TIME PERIOD./ WE POINT OUT TO THEM THAT  
THIS IS ALL TOO FREQUENTLY REAL LIFE./

WITH THIS BUDGET EXERCISE AS BACK-  
GROUND,/WE GO ON TO THE CONTROVERSIAL  
FIELD/OF SYSTEMS ANALYSIS AND ANALYTIC  
TECHNIQUES./ WE SPEND TIME DESCRIBING  
SPECIFIC ANALYTIC TOOLS/SUCH AS PROBA-  
BILITY, STATISTICS,/LINEAR PROGRAMMING,  
AND SIMULATION./ WE POINT OUT THAT HAVING  
ESTABLISHED THE BASIC OBJECTIVE,/YOU  
CAN USE SUCH TECHNIQUES/TO HELP YOU  
MAKE YOUR CHOICES./ IF YOU WANT TO  
CHOOSE BETWEEN NUCLEAR POWERED FRIGATES/  
AND CONVENTIONAL DESTROYER ESCORTS,/YOU  
CAN SIMULATE DIFFERENT TACTICAL SCENARIOS./  
YOU CAN MAKE COST COMPARISONS,/AS LONG  
AS YOU RECOGNIZE THE SUBTLETIES/OF SUCH  
TRICKS AS DISCOUNTING;/DIFFERENTIATE

THE USEFUL LIFE OF THESE TWO SHIPS;  
AND ALLOW FOR THE FACT THAT EACH CAN DO  
MISSIONS THAT THE OTHER CAN'T AND THERE-  
FORE THEY ARE NOT PARTICULARLY COMPARABLE  
ITEMS.

I WOULD EMPHASIZE, AGAIN, THAT WE  
ARE NOT TREATING CURRENT ISSUES. WE  
HAVE SELECTED PROBLEMS THAT ARE BEST  
SUITED TO BRING OUT THE PARTICULAR  
ACADEMIC POINTS BEING STRESSED. A FEW  
OF THESE ARE REAL LIFE, PRESENT DAY  
ISSUES, BUT THE MAJORITY ARE HISTORICAL  
OR ARTIFICIAL. THE STUDENT, HOWEVER,  
DOES MORE THAN SIMPLY HEAR ABOUT THESE  
ANALYTIC TECHNIQUES; HE GETS OUT HIS  
PAPER AND PENCIL EVERY NIGHT AND WORKS  
THE PROBLEMS. WE DO NOT EXPECT HIM TO  
BECOME A LINEAR PROGRAMMER OR ANALYST,  
BUT WE DO EXPECT HIM TO HAVE RUBBED  
ELBOWS WITH LINEAR PROGRAMMERS, TO  
KNOW THE TERMINOLOGY AND WHERE SUCH  
TECHNIQUES ARE MOST APPLICABLE.

IN THE NEXT PHASE OF OUR DECISION  
MAKING COURSE, / WE CAUTION THE STUDENT /  
THAT HAVING DONE THE VERY BEST ANALYSIS  
POSSIBLE, / AND HAVING MADE THE VERY BEST  
DECISION YOU CAN, / YOU MUST PAY ATTENTION  
TO HOW YOU GET YOUR DECISION CARRIED OUT. /  
WE PUT CONSIDERABLE EMPHASIS ON IMPLEMEN-  
TATION. / WE PROVIDE A SERIES OF READINGS, /  
PANEL DISCUSSIONS AND SEMINAR MEETINGS  
ON FIVE PRINCIPAL ISSUES. / THE FIRST  
IS THE NECESSITY FOR BRINGING THE  
BUREAUCRACY ALONG WITH YOU. / THIS MEANS  
BOTH YOUR OWN ORGANIZATION / AND THE OTHER  
BUREAUCRATIC ELEMENTS ABOVE IT. / EACH  
BUREAUCRACY HAS ITS OWN BUILT-IN RESIST-  
ANCE TO CHANGE / AND THE DECISION MAKER  
HAD BEST TAKE THIS INTO ACCOUNT. / WE  
BRING A GROUP OF EMMINENT BUREAUCRATS  
TO THE WAR COLLEGE, / THOUGH SOME OF  
THEM RESENT THE TITLE. / DOC COOKE WHO  
HAS ALREADY ADDRESSED YOU / WAS KIND ENOUGH

TO COME UP FOR ONE OF OUR SESSIONS  
THIS YEAR. / THESE PEOPLE GIVE SHORT  
TALKS, / JOIN A PANEL WITH THE STUDENTS, /  
AND THEN MIGRATE AMONG OUR SEMINAR  
GROUPS / FOR HEAD-TO-HEAD DISCUSSIONS. /  
THEY STAY WITH US FROM NOON ONE DAY  
UNTIL THE NEXT AFTERNOON. THEY ARE  
WORKED INTENSELY EVEN OVER LUNCHEON  
AND DINNER. / THEY DO A GREAT DEAL TO  
ADD REALISM TO THE PROGRAM. /

WE USE THE SAME PROCEDURE TO COVER  
THE RELATIONSHIP / WITH CONGRESS / AND WITH  
INDUSTRY, / POINTING OUT THAT IF YOU  
CAN'T GET THE CONGRESS TO BUY YOUR PRO-  
GRAM / OR INDUSTRY TO BUILD IT AT ROUGHLY  
THE COST ESTIMATED, / YOU HAVEN'T ACCOMP-  
LISHED A THING; / NO MATTER HOW FINELY  
YOU HAVE TUNED YOUR DECISION. / WE DO THE  
SAME THING WITH HUMAN RESOURCES / INCLUDING  
RACE RELATIONS, / POINTING OUT THAT IF YOU  
DO NOT MOTIVATE PEOPLE, / YOU WILL BE  
INEFFECTIVE. / FINALLY, WE BRING IN

REPRESENTATIVES FROM THE MEDIA/TO HELP  
OUR STUDENTS REALIZE THAT MILITARY PRO-  
GRAMS/MUST BE UNDERSTOOD BY AND ACCEPT-  
ABLE TO THE GENERAL PUBLIC./ WE FEEL  
THAT THESE FIVE SECTIONS ON IMPLEMENTA-  
TION/WILL PREVENT OUR STUDENTS FROM  
LEAVING OVERLY IDEALISTIC/ABOUT THE  
APPLICATIONS OF PURE ANALYSIS./

AGAIN, THOUGH, WHAT WE ARE REALLY  
ATTEMPTING TO DO/IS TO PRODUCE OFFICERS  
WHO UNDERSTAND/THAT THEY MUST COMBINE  
THE PRECISE TECHNIQUES OF THE PHYSICAL  
SCIENCES/WITH THE INEXACTNESS AND  
APPROXIMATIONS OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES./  
THE SAME BASIC THREAD RUNS THROUGH THE  
DEFENSE DECISION MAKING COURSE/AND THE  
STRATEGY COURSE./

FINALLY, THE LAST PART OF OUR  
CURRICULUM AT THE NAVAL WAR COLLEGE/  
CONCERNS WHAT WE CALL TACTICS./ WITH  
THE DIMINISHED SIZE OF THE MILITARY  
ESTABLISHMENT,/WE MUST BE ABLE TO GET

THE VERY MOST FROM EVERY UNIT THAT WE  
HAVE. / WE MUST EMPLOY OUR FORCES  
TACTICALLY IN THE BEST WAY POSSIBLE. /

HERE, IN TACTICS, THE METHODOLOGY  
OF THE SCIENTIFIC APPROACH / IS VERY MUCH  
WITH US. / AFTER ALL, IN ANY TACTICAL  
INTERACTION, / THERE ARE MATHEMATICAL  
ESTIMATIONS THAT CAN BE MADE. / A RADAR  
HAS A CERTAIN RANGE, / A CERTAIN PROBA-  
BILITY OF DETECTION / AND CERTAIN ERRORS  
THAT YOU CAN ANTICIPATE. / THEORETICALLY,  
YOU CAN WORK OUT QUITE PRECISELY / WHAT  
TO EXPECT UNDER CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES. /

THERE IS ONE HITCH OF COURSE. /  
SOMETIMES WE DO NOT REALLY KNOW / WHAT  
NUMBERS TO PUT IN THESE MATHEMATICAL  
EQUATIONS. / WE DO NOT KNOW WHAT THE  
WEATHER / IS GOING TO BE LIKE TOMORROW  
AFTERNOON; / AND WE ARE NOT EVEN SURE WHEN  
THE WEATHER IS BAD / WHAT EFFECT THIS HAS  
ON THE RADAR. / AGAIN WE ARE DEALING WITH  
THE IMPRECISE. / OFFICERS MUST BE WILLING



AND ABLE TO MAKE THEIR OWN ESTIMATES/ON  
HOW WELL A RADARMAN IS GOING TO PERFORM,/AND  
COMBINE THAT WITH AN EXACT CALCULA-  
TION/OF THE CHARACTERISTICS, FREQUENCIES,  
RANGES/AND OTHER DETAILS OF THE RADAR./

IF WE CAN JUST TEACH THE STUDENTS  
TO BE SYSTEMATIC/AND LOGICAL IN THEIR  
APPROACH,/THEIR GUESSES WILL BE MORE  
THAN THAT./ WE WANT THEM TO UNDERSTAND  
THAT/EVEN IF TACTICAL CHOICES CANNOT BE  
CALCULATED PRECISELY,/IT IS A BIG HELP  
TO IDENTIFY YOUR CHOICES EXPLICITLY/AND  
TO KNOW WHAT ESTIMATES AND GUESSES YOU  
MUST MAKE./

NOW THIS PROCESS OF DEVELOPING LEADERS WHO CAN DEAL WITH THE UNCERTAINTIES OF STRATEGY, WITH THE COMBINATION OF PRECISE ANALYSIS AND JUDGMENT IN DEFENSE DECISION-MAKING AND WITH THE PROBABILITIES OF TACTICS MEANS SEVERAL THINGS TO US. ONE IS THAT THERE WILL BE MORE EMPHASIS ON MID-CAREER WAR COLLEGE EDUCATION IN OUR NEW NAVY. THERE HAS BEEN, OF COURSE, A MARKED INCREASE IN MID-CAREER EXECUTIVE DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS SINCE WORLD WAR II. THE HARVARD BUSINESS SCHOOL WAS ONE OF THE FIRST TO MOVE INTO THIS FIELD IN 1943. TODAY OVER 50 UNIVERSITIES CONDUCT FULL TIME EXECUTIVE DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS. A NUMBER OF LARGE CORPORATIONS SUCH AS GENERAL ELECTRIC AND MOTOROLA HAVE THEIR OWN IN-HOUSE PROGRAMS. SO DOES THE AMERICAN MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION, THE INTERNATIONAL MARKETING INSTITUTE AND THE INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT. OUR PROGRAM, THOUGH, IS

PLACING EMPHASIS/ON TWO PARTICULAR DIRECTIONS  
THAT ARE SIGNIFICANT./

FIRST, WE ARE SETTING TRULY DEMANDING  
ACADEMIC STANDARDS/AND MAKING THE STUDENT-  
OFFICER MEASURE UP./ OUR COURSE IS, I BELIEVE  
ACADEMICALLY EQUIVALENT/TO THE MASTER'S  
DEGREE PROGRAMS AT MANY OF OUR UNIVERSITIES/  
WE REQUIRE WRITTEN REPORTS./ WE TEST OUR  
STUDENTS WITH WRITTEN EXAMINATIONS./ WE ARE  
BREAKING AWAY FROM THE COMFORTABLE TRADITION/  
THAT BUSINESS/MILITARY EXECUTIVES AT AGE 40  
OR THEREABOUTS,/ARE ABOVE THIS SORT OF  
THING/AND SHOULD NOT BE SUBJECTED TO THE  
EMBARRASSMENT OF PUBLIC COMPETITION./ AS I  
WILL EXPLAIN IN A MOMENT, THE STAKES ARE  
TOO HIGH IN OUR PROFESSION/TO BE THAT  
GENTLEMANLY ANY LONGER./

AT THE SAME TIME, I WOULD ACKNOWLEDGE/  
THAT THERE ARE RISKS IN THIS NEW APPROACH./  
MID-CAREER STUDENT OFFICERS ARE FIERCELY  
COMPETITIVE./ TOO MUCH EMPHASIS ON MEASURING  
THEIR PERFORMANCE/COULD DISTORT THEIR

EFFORTS FROM LEARNING TO WINNING. / THERE IS  
ALSO, FRANKLY, A RISK OF BREAKING THE  
SPIRIT / OF SOME WHO CANNOT MAKE THE GRADE. /

OUR SECOND POINT OF EMPHASIS IS ON  
DELIBERATELY ATTEMPTING / TO RESHAPE THE  
HABITS OF THINKING OF OUR STUDENT OFFICERS. /  
WE ARE NOT IMPARTING INFORMATION / OR UP-  
DATING FACTUAL DATA BANKS. / WE INEVITABLY  
ACQUAINT THE STUDENT WITH SOME NEW  
KNOWLEDGE, / BUT THAT IS A BY-PRODUCT. /

THIS WHOLE IDEA IS RISKY BUSINESS. /  
SOME MEN MAY SIMPLY LOSE THEIR BEARINGS / IN  
A NEW WORLD OF UNCERTAINTY AND INEXACTNESS. /  
WE MAY DEPRIVE THEM OF THEIR CONFIDENCE /  
THAT THERE ARE RIGHT ANSWERS / WITHOUT  
DEVELOPING A COMPETENCE TO COPE WITH  
UNCERTAINTY. /

WHY ARE WE ACCEPTING ALL OF THESE RISKS /  
IN DEMANDING HIGH ACADEMIC PERFORMANCE / AND  
IN ATTEMPTING TO RESTRUCTURE THOUGHT  
PROCESSES? / I AM PERSUADED THAT IN THE  
WORLD OF THE MILITARY OF THE 1970'S AND

1980'S / THERE WILL BE DEMANDS FOR HIGHER  
INTELLECTUAL STANDARDS / AND FOR GREATER  
COMPETITIVENESS. / THE GENTLEMANLY FRATERNAL  
SPIRIT IS WANING. /

WE IN UNIFORM SIMPLY MUST BE ABLE TO  
PRESENT OUR CASE / IN A MORE CONVINCING MANNER  
TO A MORE SOPHISTICATED AUDIENCE. / WE ARE,  
QUITE PROPERLY, UNDER CLOSER SCRUTINY TODAY /  
THAN PERHAPS EVER BEFORE. / IF WE DO NOT OR  
CANNOT MAKE OUR CASE WELL, / THIS CRITICISM  
COULD POSSIBLY LEAD THIS COUNTRY / INTO A  
REPETITION OF ITS REJECTION OF MILITARY  
PREPAREDNESS / AS IN THE 1920'S AND 1930'S. /  
LACK OF PREPAREDNESS TODAY WOULD HAVE FAR  
MORE SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES / THAN IT DID THEN. /  
OUR POSITION AND RESPONSIBILITIES IN THE  
WORLD / ARE VASTLY DIFFERENT. / WITH INTER-  
CONTINENTAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS ABROAD, / THE  
CONSEQUENCES OF UNPREPAREDNESS IN THAT  
SPHERE ARE OBVIOUS, / AND THEY SPILL OVER INTO  
THE OTHER MILITARY AREAS. /

WHAT SIZE AND SHAPE OF MILITARY FORCES WE REQUIRE / IN THE 1970'S IS NOT FOR US TO SAY. / IT IS FOR THE CITIZENS OF THE COUNTRY, THROUGH THE CONGRESS, TO DETERMINE. / BUT, THERE IS GREAT RESPONSIBILITY ON ALL OF US TODAY / TO PRESENT THE MILITARY PICTURE LUCIDLY, / LEST THE COUNTRY MAKE DECISIONS BASED ON ONLY ONE SIDE OF THE EQUATION. / IT IS FROM THIS THAT MY FEELING COMES / THAT WE MUST BE MORE DEMANDING IN CULTIVATING THE INTELLECTUAL CAPACITY / OF OUR MILITARY AND CIVILIAN DEFENSE LEADERS OF TOMORROW. /

I HOPE THAT THIS CULTIVATION WILL BRING TO YOU IN THE WASHINGTON ARENA, / OFFICERS WHO ARE BETTER PREPARED TO DEAL WITH THE UNCERTAIN / AND IMPRECISE WORLD OF DECISION MAKING IN WHICH WE LIVE. / I HOPE THAT WE ARE SHAKING OUT SOME OF THEIR PENCHANT / FOR RIGHT AND WRONG ANSWERS, / FOR VERITIES AND CERTITUDES WHICH DO NOT EXIST. / THEY WILL NOT COME TO WASHINGTON FAMILIAR WITH THE LATEST STEPS, / SCHEDULES AND JARGON OF THE

PPB SYSTEM. / I BELIEVE, THOUGH, THEY WILL  
COME MORE INTELLECTUALLY ATTUNED / TO LEARN  
THOSE THINGS QUICKLY AND TO BE REALLY  
EFFECTIVE. /

AGAIN, I REGRET THAT I COULD NOT BE  
WITH YOU PERSONALLY / TO ENJOY A DIRECT  
EXCHANGE OF IDEAS / AND A QUESTION AND ANSWER  
PERIOD. / I WILL BE HAPPY TO PROVIDE ANY  
SPECIFIC DETAILS / ABOUT OUR PROGRAM THAT YOU  
MIGHT DESIRE, / EITHER BY PHONE OR BY LETTER, /  
AND I WOULD ALWAYS BE DELIGHTED TO HAVE ANY  
ONE OF YOU / COME TO NEWPORT AND SEE OUR NEW  
PROGRAM IN ACTION. / SCHOOL STARTS AGAIN ON  
AUGUST 30th. /